We will not revisit the French team’s South Africa campaign, which, in its dramatic evolution, left a mark on the memory of sportsmen and soccer fans.
An important group of treating physicians immediately rushed to the aid of the major patient.
Leading the way is the President of the Republic, who has convened the General States of French football! Why? To play the role of Machiavelli’s ‘Prince’ and formulate a strategy for the future? To make a demonstration of governmental “chobizenesse” as in the Jean Yann film? The question (oh, how complex) demands a more sober and serious approach, akin to certain government members.
Roselyne Bachelot, the Minister of Supervision, boosted by the success of her management technique in the pandemic affair, has taken on the role of aunt-nurse, alternating her diagnosis of the players… ‘they applauded me and they cried’ (and 48 hours later) ‘they were thugs ordered by kingpins’.
Rama Yade, Secretary of State for Sports, on her side, always in search of TV reports and photos, reduced the sense of belonging of players to the French team jersey to the fact of singing (loud and clear!) the Marseillaise: will we have a choir on the field?
Sporting bodies in search
Not forgetting the President of the French Football Federation (FFF) who, after 50 years of activity as a director and 5 years as president, discovers that this is not, or no longer, his world?
Finally, the various federal ‘barons’ who, taking the necessary time for a new election of federal bodies, will be able to work to establish the necessary agreements so that ‘everything changes so that nothing changes’ (cf. Prince of Salina in “The Leopard”). The most obvious change will be to set a limit on the number of electoral mandates to promote the renewal of people in the same functions.
Let’s not forget the president of the Professional Football League (LFP) who, elected to the FFF Council since 1992 (…just 18 years!) suddenly discovers a reformist soul and declares ‘urbi et orbi’ with daily cadence that everything must be questioned.
This is why the future of French football, and notably the Blues, risks being reduced to the usual ‘invocatio nominis’ which this time is called “Saint-Laurent”, the divine surname of the new national coach.
Indeed, it will be the next results of the French team that will or will not allow the fire of this World Cup (results and related behaviors) to be extinguished and to be filed in the archives under ‘negative memories’.
But if we really want to understand the reasons for what happened and correctly analyze the two worlds of football, the French and its Spanish counterpart, it is easily understood that the results obtained by each at the World Cup 2010 look back far…
The Spanish team and the strength of its coach Vicente Del Bosque
Indeed, it must be said that the Spanish team based its strength on a coach-selector, the pleasant and experienced Vicente Del Bosque who knew how to harmonize between the players of two historically rival clubs (FC Barcelona and Real Madrid). He integrated into the azul-grana block (including neo-Barcelona forward Villa and probably soon-to-be Barcelona midfielder Fabregas), the one that currently produces the best play. Elements of the highest technical and tactical level were also brought into play, including some Madrid stars (goalkeeper and captain Casillas primarily) and others such as Madrid defenders Sergio Ramos and Capdevilla of La Coruña, plus a few substitutes.
Only forward Torres (one of the two exiles in the Premier League) missed the appointment of this tournament, although he was decisive in the 2008 European Championship victory.
A training policy that has the means in Spain
Why can the Spanish selection rely on high-quality players such as Xavi, Iniesta, even Pujol while others like Piqué, Busquets, Pedro are announced as the next generation?
Is there a secret to explaining this?
The answer is simple: the detection-formation policy of the ‘cantera de la Casa Màsa’, the FCB training center, where hundreds of young people mainly from regional clubs go to school and are trained to become future ‘pros’.
But beyond the program (all clubs talk to you about training!), FCB has also put in the financial resources that generated the necessary organizational dynamics: 15 million euros per year.
Who can say the same in France?
In reality, it is the economic system of French football that is fragile compared to the Spanish system.
First, the clubs, where facing “super-cruisers” like FC Barcelona and Real Madrid, we find medium-sized clubs like Olympique Lyonnais or Olympique Marseille, integrated over the seasons by Bordeaux or PSG.
This allows or forces French stars to take the path of exile to monetize their talents and hope to achieve international notoriety.
How many Spanish players of the World Champion team played abroad and how many French players?
An answer lies perhaps there, even if it is not the only one.
Yet the diagnosis is even more interesting and unfortunately damning if we consider the ‘key-numbers’ of the Deloitte 2009 report, which analyzes and compares the 5 most important European Professional Leagues (Germany, England, Italy, Spain, and France).
A comparison in a few figures
Here are some comparisons between Spain and France:
Turnover (2007-8 season):
– Spain 1,438 million euros
– France 989,000 €
TV rights:
Spain: 40%
France: 56%
Stadium revenue (ticketing+others):
Spain: 28%
France: 14%
Sponsorship & marketing
Spain: 32%
France: 30%
Labor costs compared to turnover: Spain 63% / France 71%
If we come to flagship clubs of each League (ranking of the top 20):
turnover (2008-2009):
Real Madrid (1st): 401 million euros; FCB (2): 365.9; OL (13) 139.6; OM (14) 133.2 including TV rights: RM 40%, FCB 43%, OL 49%, OM 49%. Stadium revenue: RM 25%, FCB 26%, OL 16%, OM 19% and sponsorship & marketing: RM 35%, FCB 31%, OL 35%, OM 32%
And if we add to this the benchmarking concerning social and tax charges for foreign players (who are in most cases still players with a community passport) we can see the enormous difference in cost compared to the same net salary (example: 2 million euros net) due to a more favorable tax system (since January 1, 2010, certain tax advantages for foreign players have been eliminated):
Spain 2,680 / France 5,430
Average number of spectators (2008-2009) in the championship:
Spain 24,500 France 20,900
Per club:
RM 64,300 / FCB 66,800 / OM 52,300 / OL 37,400
Number of supporters (notoriety index):
Spain 93,400 (including 17,800 in Spain and 75,600 in the rest of the world)
FR 22,600 (18,900 + 3,700).
Numbers speak for themselves
As we have seen, all the indicators are unfavorable to French football and also in specific tables that take into account the most important clubs.
Conclusion and moral: French football is structurally inferior to the Spanish one (and similarly to other major European countries) and the ranking of international competitions reflects this situation.
The opposite can only be a surprise and stems from an exceptional situation due to different factors, such as a generation of players where some champions act as locomotives (Platini at the European Championship 1984, Zidane at the WC 1998 and the European Championship 2000), a particularly well-managed team and favorable circumstances.
But the truth remains this, and without structural reforms, the results can only be a result of this.
So it is not necessary to cry scandal and look elsewhere for what is simply the conclusion of a real situation.
‘Nomina-t-il sunt consequentia rerum’ (situations are the consequence of things), said the Latins.
The reality is there: will the world of French football recognize it and undertake the necessary changes to modify it?
Is there in this world as much talent, capacity, and will to do it successfully?
The question is there and the answer can only come from within.
Because if one prefers to resign from responsibilities and entrust them to one or more ‘doctors’ whose names have been cited… as much to invoke the ‘spe salvi’ (hope will save us) which is the invocation of all powerlessness!
