Things have not changed to the extent that it would alter my thinking about Europe. A year ago, it was clear that the vote on the European Constitution would gather voices with very fragmented motivations. The French “no” must be analyzed through this lens: there were indeed French people who expressly expressed their opposition to the European project as it had been presented to them. Others, in just as significant a proportion, used this electoral opportunity to affirm their disagreement with the policy being followed, or even the absence of policy in struggling sectors of the nation. Politicians who so easily ignored, in the months preceding this vote, the electoral demands in the sociological sense of the term, significantly contributed to giving an internal meaning to this European vote. The denial of politics, as one speaks of a denial of justice, which manifests itself through inaction in the name of preserving social peace, however precarious, bears a heavy responsibility with regard to history.
It seems to me necessary to clarify an idea: a very large majority of French people are certainly not hostile to the idea of Europe, just as one cannot be opposed to the fight against hunger and poverty in the world or to the pursuit of peace and well-being of peoples. In this sense, declaring oneself in favor of Europe falls into a kind of truism and does not really serve reflection. It is in what it shows of its actions, its practices, and its prospects that Europe arouses concerns, if not outright rejection. If the consultation had only been about the European Charter, the first part and the most philosophical of the text, it is likely that the result would have been different.
The word “taboo” seems exaggerated to me. I would rather say that the European subject is embarrassing, if not causing deep disarray. One no longer knows, if I dare say, where to start! In a pessimistic view, and in light of a debate whose public richness before the vote gave way to an almost shameful lethargy afterward, it is probably necessary to confirm that the situation has not fundamentally changed. And for good reason! The essential questions remain. Let’s take one of them that was particularly “present by its absence” during the debate on this European Constitution: Turkey’s entry into the Union. Negotiations with Turkey quietly began in October of last year, and Brussels has recently signed an agreement with Ankara for the first of the 25 chapters, certainly the easiest to resolve, that condition EU membership.
The French “no” integrated, whether politicians accept it or not, the refusal of Turkish arrival in the European fold. This inability to hear the “hidden meaning” of the consultation speaks volumes about the stakes and foreshadows the risks of slippages that may occur during the next presidential election. Do the French General Intelligence Services not credit, according to what is heard in “city dinners,” the National Front with more than 25% of the voting intentions? Despite those who denounce the “declinologists,” the demographic projections until 2050 for both member countries and candidates to the Union are overwhelming: all will experience in the coming years (or have already experienced for some of them) a reversal of population growth, bringing it back in 2050 to its 1985 level! With mechanical consequences: a fall in growth to around 1.1% from 2020 and a considerable decrease in the European share in global production from 23% in 2000 to 12% in 2050. All? Not quite. One country, Turkey, will almost double its population during this period. And the 100 million Turks estimated for 2050 appear as those who will allow the European share in global GDP to remain close to 20%. A Cornelian dilemma, one understands, for both sides.
The French “no” was not followed by the sensational consequences announced. The loss of French influence in the appointments of officials in Brussels was already commonplace by the late 90s. To the French sometimes described as “ideologists”, often prisoners of conceptual schemas, European leaders preferred the “pragmatic” in the Anglo-Saxon style. The European influence would have even increased in foreign policy: awareness of energy issues by the increasing intransigence of Russia in this matter, interface diplomacy to manage the Iranian nuclear challenge, and the efficiency of a common position after the election of Hamas to the Palestinian Parliament. Euphoria certainly to be nuanced: Tehran remains obsessed with a bilateral relationship with Washington. I remember in this regard, an interview with the Director of Political Affairs of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who declared to me at the beginning of the 90s that “for Iran, Europe was only a stopover on the road to the United States”. Point taken.
In the account of his “memories” after his time at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tocqueville already noted: “Democracies most often have very confused or very erroneous ideas about their foreign affairs… and rarely resolve external questions by reasons from within”. It seems to me that nothing important will happen on the European subject before the presidential elections of 2007. We are not alone, it must be remembered, in this situation. The Netherlands also answered the European question negatively, and the Dutch Foreign Minister explains, in a recent column in “Le Monde”, that the no would still prevail a year later in his country. Quite rightly, the Minister draws conclusions: the Dutch have expressed what they “did not want” for Europe. Now, according to him, remains “to know what they wanted”. At the risk of hurting our national narcissism, always so quick to exacerbate, we could usefully draw inspiration from the reflection of a “modest” neighboring country.
Jean-Luc Vannier
Psychoanalyst
Lecturer at the University
