Are we back to the days of the Cold War? Vladimir Putin’s particularly forceful intervention at the Munich seminar on February 10th gives every appearance of it. Appearances only. While he strongly denounced the “unilateral and illegitimate actions” of the United States, their “overstepping of their national borders in all areas,” and their “increasing disregard for international law,” the master of the Kremlin surprised his interlocutors more than he convinced them.
And for good reason. From the forced exile in distant Siberia of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Russian oil magnate who could become a political rival, to his desire to almost directly influence the next 2008 presidential elections, the reassertion of control by the former KGB officer over the entire political and economic system of Russia makes it difficult to accept him as a lecturer on democracy. Perhaps he remains a prisoner of a political culture and a period in history when it was fashionable to copiously lambast the Americans… while seeking to imitate and surpass their model? If this isn’t a return to the Cold War, then we must look elsewhere. Despite its high growth rate, oil revenues, and industrial enormity, Putin’s Russia still cannot compete with American power, especially militarily. The head of the Kremlin has understood this very well. The Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency recently explained to “Le Monde” that the Americans “do not need missile sites abroad to gain any advantage” over the Russians; their capacities have been “sufficient against them for years.” And when the Russian president storms against NATO’s advance to the borders of Russia, seeming – paradoxically! – to advocate for the European countries once under Soviet control, he forgets that these countries – like Poland and the Czech Republic who will host elements of the future missile shield – have made the democratic choice to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty.
It is precisely because he understands the limits of his possibilities that Vladimir Putin has deliberately chosen a two-pronged strategy: declarative and nuisance. Through this, the Kremlin seeks to gather behind him a particularly heterogeneous group of medium powers to use in a logic aimed at “containing” the advances of American influence around the world. A strange and ironic twist of history since it was the same strategy deployed by the USA after World War II to “contain” Soviet expansion. This is perhaps where a remnant of the Cold War should be sought. In fact, the President of the Russian Federation takes on the role of an all-around gatherer of oppositions to American policies worldwide. Similar to some Arab or Persian leaders: Saddam Hussein attempted it with the Arab world, Khomeini with certain Muslim countries, albeit on a more limited scale. Russia can rightly consider a wider circle of support, to the point of “hunting” on traditional American influence grounds. Vladimir Putin’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia, while Moscow clearly supports Iran on the nuclear issue, illustrates this.
The implementation of this strategy presents a triple advantage for Moscow: Russia possesses authentic institutional influence (nuclear power, veto right in the Security Council, member of the G8…) which it can thus offer to servant countries. And with which the United States must reckon. Its energy resources, which it does not hesitate to use in negotiations bordering on blackmail, will thus be even more valued. Finally, the next Russian president – perhaps the same or probably a clone trained in the corridors of the Kremlin – will benefit from this monopolistic relationship with the Americans. As with any exclusive situation, it is likely that for those countries wishing to make their voices heard or counter US interests and wishing to join this very closed club, the entry ticket will certainly be very high.
