To those who demanded, for the new “phase” of his mandate, an increased presidentialization of his image, Nicolas Sarkozy has amply responded with his speech in Cherbourg on March 21st. On the occasion of the launch of the SSBN “Le Terrible,” the head of state fully assumed his role as the “keystone” of French deterrence. Emphasizing the fundamental purposes of the latter, “national independence” and “decision-making autonomy,” and recalling its “strictly defensive” posture, he even adopted the philosophy of the Mitterrandian formula – “deterrence is me” – on the necessity of a sovereign and singular judgment at the ultimate moment: a means to remove any doubt in a potential aggressor about the French determination to exercise its retaliatory capabilities. To the extent of regretting, as commander-in-chief, not being able – yet – to personally deliver to parliamentarians the conclusions of the forthcoming White Paper on defense.
In his return to strict nuclear orthodoxy, the head of state nonetheless launched four areas of reflection that demonstrate his firm convictions on the subject: First, the evolution of the White Paper on defense, integrating “security” and “national interests” now likely, according to the President, to “play out far from our borders.” Then, a notion of “nuclear warning” intended to “restore deterrence” for potential aggressors who might “misunderstand the determination” of France. Furthermore, “anti-missile defense capabilities” which France, as Nicolas Sarkozy explained using the conditional, “could” acquire as a “useful complement to deterrence.” Finally, as France prepares for the rotating presidency of Europe next July, the initiation of a dialogue with the “European countries that wish to” to examine an extension of the role of this force whose “mere existence” – deterrence by deterrence dear to a former General – contributes “de facto” to European security. Along the way, the head of state reminded that France and Great Britain share a number of vital interests.
This solid redefinition, if one dares say, of the “melting core” of nuclear doctrine nevertheless encompasses a grid of new and expanded threats to “vulnerabilities” that aggressors with “limitless imagination” would be tempted to exploit, even those who “violate international norms.” One can only commend, a priori, Nicolas Sarkozy’s intent to enrich with so many demands the never-exhaustive catalogue of topics related to the defense and security of the nation. Including so many advantageous clauses in this “life insurance” contract with the French, however, mismatches – to stretch the metaphor to its limit – with the conditions of good health represented by the recurrent softness of our diplomacy. Worse, they carry the risk of diminishing the scope of the President’s declarative strategy, an integral part of the indispensable deterrence nebula. Indeed, it must be observed that for Africa or China, for example, France is showing – to use a euphemism – a rare restraint. The manner in which the authorities of Chad ignore the urgent calls from Paris to respect the rights of the political opposition in the country, the absence of pressures aimed at compelling Syria to find a solution in the Lebanese crisis, and, especially, the timidity of the French reaction to the bloody repression of Tibetan monks by Chinese forces create the perception of a disconnect between the reaffirmed power of our military apparatus and the worried caution of our diplomatic action. Frankly, there’s a dangerous ambivalence between the impossibility of too much and the emptiness of not enough.
The strong impetus given to the modernization of our defense by the head of state must necessarily be accompanied by equally scrupulous diplomacy. The credibility of the former will not go without that of the latter.
