Unfortunate coincidence of the calendar: it is at the moment when particularly high assessments of the terrible attacks committed in Bombay are being made, already described by the local and foreign press as “Indian September 11th,” that Barack Obama unveils his new National Security Council team. Of course, the anticipated confirmation of Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State certainly has an element of domestic politics: it aims to seal a definitive reconciliation between the two former candidates—and their respective factions—within the Democratic camp. There is little doubt, however, that this appointment, which could be complemented by the nomination of General James Jones—a former Marine Commander of NATO forces in Europe—as the President’s Security Advisor, as well as the retention of the current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, illustrates a clear intention of the president-elect: to give his mandate a bipartisan tone where Democrats and Republicans must jointly face the challenges of the future world. Particularly those of terrorism. A terrorism that now focuses its attacks on a part of the world—India, Pakistan, Southeast Asia—as if their perpetrators sought to anticipate this global evolution that heralds the inexorable transfer of growth, economic activities, and financial flows from the West to the East of the planet.
A few weeks apart, two reports published in the United States have just contemplated the new approaches that could be adopted by the American Administration in its fight against the most radical groups. The first study conducted by the specialists of the Rand Corporation, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida,” attempts to define the means to put an end to the activities and support of Islamist terrorist groups. It notes a “sophistication,” especially in urban environments, of “the actions of terrorist groups in human and logistical terms,” an argument capable of dismissing the American claim to combat them solely by military means. Hence, the authors’ expressed desire to replace the concept of “War on Terror” with that of “counterterrorism,” a difference which, according to them, is not merely semantic. This allows for the elimination of the idea of a “battlefield as a solution to the problem,” as well as avoiding a form of “legitimization of the terrorists that could be induced by the term war.” The report particularly emphasizes the double priority that should be that of the next team in Washington: strengthening the means of police and intelligence services, intensifying their cooperation with the authorities of the concerned countries, as well as disengaging military forces, whose results are considered ineffective, in favor of local security forces, more legitimate to intervene.
More recently, the other report entitled “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” originates from the American National Intelligence Council. It explains that by 2025, “descendants of long-established terrorist groups,” who will “inherit organizational structures,” “chains of command,” and the “training procedures” necessary for conducting sophisticated actions, will be joined by “newly emerging groups founded on self-radicalization” and the consideration of “local living conditions.” Reasoning in terms of “waves of terrorism,” the authors hold as fundamental the understanding of “how and why one terrorist group succeeds another.”
If, in retrospect, these two reports cast a harsh light on the latest events in Bombay, they converge, let’s note in passing, on a crucial point: in about fifteen years, the United States will retain a considerable level of power that they will still have to share with a multitude of other states in the world. An argument on the possible dilution of responsibilities to which terrorists are unlikely to be very receptive.
