Indeed, freedom of the press and privacy are both “constitutional goods,” but the former prevails over the latter. Why? Because the protection of privacy is considered an exception in relation to the imperative and fundamental right of freedom of information and criticism.
A right without which “popular sovereignty” could not exist because the people can be considered constitutionally “sovereign” only if they are fully informed about all matters of public interest. It is only in this case that public opinion can be considered fully and unconditionally formed.
Freedom of information must be clearly considered predominant compared to personal rights of reputation and confidentiality, in the sense that the latter, where certain conditions exist, are a limit to it.
The fundamental principle is that “sovereignty” belongs to the people, who must exercise it within the forms and limits of the Constitution.
The premise for a full, legitimate, and correct exercise of such sovereignty is that it is realized with all democratic modalities. A primary role is given to the activity of information, which must therefore be considered a condition of popular sovereignty.
The protection of reputation and privacy are to be classified among the exceptions concerning the general principle of freedom of information. The latter must be exercised with only one deontological limitation: the dissemination of information of public or social interest is not opposed to respecting the privacy of known persons or those holding public functions, provided that this information is important concerning their role and public life.
Conclusion and moral: this battle, as everyone will have understood, is above all a “false” conflict. What is at stake is not really or only the right to be informed about important facts of public life or to impose silence on them. To claim that the Bettencourt file concerns personal matters that should be kept private to prevent publication reveals true bad faith. What is at stake is much more.
It is the very conception of democratic life, a defense against the law of the strongest, the grand return of the “Secret,” the “nihil principle” (one should not talk about politics) of the Ancien Rรฉgime.
But Kant taught us that the transition from the “nihil principle” to “sapere aude” (dare to know) allows citizens to have the courage to exercise their rational knowledge and, together with others, generate a civil coexistence under the sign of public rationality.
This is how modern political thought asserts itself. For modern politics, the publicity, the transparency of the person holding a public function, and especially of what is called power, is the norm, while “secrecy” is the exception and should normally apply to the State.
The question is therefore asked: Should the Bettencourt file be classified among the state secrets?
