Nice-Premium : So Jean-Luc, have you resumed your classes at the University?
Jean-Luc Vannier: Yes! The head of the Henri Alexis IUT department was gracious enough to postpone by a week the classes I had missed, and my students were particularly understanding. My psychoanalysis patients as well.
NP : What was the atmosphere like in Beirut during the days of the conflict? Were you scared?
JLV: I might surprise you by saying no. I had already experienced this “particular” atmosphere in Iraqi Kurdistan in the late 90s. The regional capital Erbil was the site of bombings by Saddam Hussein’s services, who frowned upon the arrival of foreigners and observers in that area. For Beirut, it was more a form of apprehension, definitely not fear, and it seems to me that the Lebanese around me shared this feeling, perhaps unfortunately out of habit. Even when automatic gunfire sounded for two or three consecutive nights close to my building, I must admit, strangely, I didn’t feel any particular anxiety. Maybe I have also become “Lebanized” over time…
NP : Are you saying life was normal during those days?
JLV: The most astonishing thing was indeed the contrast between the relatively busy daytime activity in public places, from Sassine Square to the ABC Mall in Achrafieh, and the deadly silence that fell over this area as soon as the sun set. All the stores closed. Even the very popular snack place “Zaatar w Zeit” in Sodeco, open non-stop 24/7 for several years, had shut down.
NP : Were there battles in your neighborhood?
JLV: The battles were just beyond my building. It is somewhat a tradition because Monnot Street had already served as a demarcation line during the civil war. The “Golden Rectangle” of Achrafieh, so named because of the four avenues that delineate the heart of the Christian quarter with this geometric shape, saw – very gradually it’s true – the presence of the army and then, when the conflict reached a climax, in the middle of the night two special police force trucks arrived. And all these troops disappeared on the very day the Doha talks were announced alongside the reopening of the airport.
NP : So, you were protected?
JLV: The visible equipment of these detachments was more symbolic than truly dissuasive. And they would not have sufficed if Hezbollah militiamen had wanted to enter this eastern area of Beirut. At the foot of my building, I spoke with a few soldiers, all Sunni Muslims from Tripoli. They explained that military command had selected them to guard this part of the city due to their religion, and that Shiite soldiers were, on the other hand, placed directly in contact with Hezbollah elements, perhaps to help temper tensions if they rose on the front line. This, nevertheless, marks the “confessionalism of the army.” I also note that during these events, several Sunni and Christian officers presented—and then withdrew—their resignations to protest what they called the selective inaction of this army. Moreover, a colonel, member of the 2nd military bureau and former aide-de-camp to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, was among them.
NP : What is your feeling about what happened in Beirut and Lebanon during those days when you were stuck there?
JLV: It seems to me, contrary to what some French diplomatic officials assert, that it is Hezbollah that, ultimately, comes out losing from this conflict. Which, it should be noted, was triggered over a major financial issue. The Prime Minister’s decree that provoked the ire of the Party of God was not aimed at its military network meant for what it calls “resistance” but at an independent civilian telecommunications network from the state. A system that brings in annually fifty million dollars to the militia outside official channels. As for the security control of the airport by a general close to Hezbollah, this had been a known fact for a long time. If the Lebanese state had to back down on these two decisions, the manner in which the Shiite militia went about achieving this created a deep and lasting unease in Lebanese society, now more divided than ever. The Party of God lost the little it had left of its “Lebanity.” Using its weapons against the Lebanese will remain a trauma engraved in the country’s history.
NP : But it was ultimately through arms that Hezbollah had its way, right?
JLV: Apparently and in the very short term, yes. But two major events occurred. The Sunni militias of “Secure Plus,” operational for a very short time and which the daily “Le Monde” had looked into, were completely overwhelmed by Hezbollah fighters. The result is a sense of humiliation among the Sunni community and a rearmament, largely confirmed by the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, of radical Salafists present in the north of the country, particularly in Tripoli. The other element is the routing of Hezbollah fighters by Druze militiamen from the Chouf, an area that had been bombarded for hours by their batteries. About fifty fighters from the Shiite militia found themselves surrounded by Druze warriors. It required a call at three in the morning from Parliament President Nabih Berri to their leader Walid Jumblatt to prevent a massacre. The Druzes even claim to have captured Iranian militants who were directing the Lebanese militiamen and to have returned them in a “piteous state”—a message, according to them, “aimed at Tehran.” For the first time, Hezbollah also experienced a form of “resistance.” Finally, and not least importantly, one cannot interpret what happened in Lebanon without taking into account regional developments: peace talks initiated between Israel and Syria, Israel’s readiness to discuss a truce with Hamas, might have pushed Hezbollah to lock in some political gains before being forced to cease using armed violence against the southern neighbor. As long as these negotiations last, it is not out of the question to better understand the financial sensitivity of the telecommunications network whose profits might partly substitute for Iranian subsidies if field actions were to slow down. If this line of reasoning holds true, it could be relatively good news for Lebanon. In the end, if there is a loser, it is chiefly General Michel Aoun, abandoned by Hezbollah in his quest for the presidency.
NP : Does the agreement signed in Doha finally put an end to this conflict?
JLV: One should certainly rejoice at this agreement. But it remains a temporary solution. And it does not solve the fundamental issues. The Doha agreement contains within it the seeds of many contradictions. Two examples come to mind. Article 2 asks the contracting parties not to “hinder the action of the Government” while the basis of this agreement explicitly rests on the “blocking minority” granted to the opposition. In other words, the first sensitive measure, concerning for example the International Tribunal charged with judging the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, or any diplomatic issue, even ultimately any direction that would decisively engage the country on a path that the opposition would not like, could be blocked and provoke anew intense and dangerous tensions. A second point concerns Article 4, in which the parties commit to “refrain from resorting to arms or violence to achieve political gains.” The article expressly targets Hezbollah’s armament, a thorny issue far from being settled. The representative of Hezbollah in Doha, moreover, stated at the end of the meeting that his “formation did not feel bound by this obligation.” When one questions a senior Hezbollah official on his definition of national agreement in Lebanon, his answer consists of explaining that “no one should be against us.” That’s to say if the future unfortunately remains fraught with threats.
NP : Can the election of a new consensual President provide a framework conducive to improving the situation?
JLV: Everything will depend on how General Michel Sleiman views his mandate, primarily devoted to preventing the reproduction of recent violence. He will not want, and probably cannot, engage in a frontal conflict with Hezbollah on several points like the recovery of state authority over the entire territory even if this orientation is explicitly stated in the compromise document. Instead, he will have to alternately give assurances to some and others, both locally and internationally: this means that major decisions intended to choose a global orientation—choices of society, regional diplomacy, links with Israel, extradition of persons likely to be indicted in the Hariri file—will be postponed. There will indeed be some appointments of ambassadors, senior officials, and some economic measures. Perhaps even the Director of General Security might change office to return to a Christian in good terms with the Shiite formation. If the Arab League, and in particular the Emir of Qatar, maintain their pressures, other subjects might yet find a resolution. Discussions on the composition of the next Cabinet will be very enlightening in this regard for the future.
NP : Should we be optimistic?
JLV: Lebanese are naturally optimistic. Just look at the massive and exuberant return of festive life downtown just hours after the end of its occupation by the Shiite militia. Their irrepressible drive for life commands admiration. Hopefully, both in Beirut and the “villages,” the upcoming tourist season, crucial for the budget and a strong sign for the political health of the country, will proceed unimpeded. In the short term, the Lebanese should experience a respite. They ultimately deserve a different fate than that of waiting and fearing the next crisis.
NP : Are you going back to Beirut this summer?
JLV: The question doesn’t even arise!
