Since 1993, Jean-Luc Vannier has been acquainted with Lebanon. He settled in Beirut (Ashrafieh) in 1999 and stayed until 2004 as a Professor at St Joseph University of Beirut and at the Center for Strategic Studies and Research of this University. He established a psychological counseling center for troubled adolescents within the Lebanese humanitarian organization Arc En Ciel and participated in patient presentations at the Der El Salib psychiatric hospital in Beirut. He regularly appeared on the television program “Dialogue of Cultures” on the Shiite channel NBN in 2002 for the Year of La Francophonie. Jean-Luc Vannier is on the editorial committee of the Lebanese psychoanalysis journal “Ashtarout” and is a member of the psychoanalytic circle of the “Pinnacle of Beirut-Nice-Paris.”
Nice-Premiere: What was your first reaction when you heard about the Israeli bombings in Lebanon? It seemed premeditated for many months, were you surprised?
Jean-Luc Vannier: We must start at the beginning: knowing whether the Israeli reaction or the kidnapping of the two Tsahal soldiers by Hezbollah was more premeditated. Hezbollah can be accused of many faults but never of a lack of organization and planning. Paradoxically, the violent Israeli response allowed Hezbollah to achieve a goal, probably sought by other states in the region: to restart a serious crisis in this part of the world.
NP: What could these goals be?
JLV: They are multiple, internal and external to Lebanon: domestically, the crisis delays the proceedings of a future criminal tribunal for the assassination of Rafic Hariri that would likely implicate the Syrians. It also showcases the “combat qualities” of Hezbollah in a world where “disoriented” youths seek exhilarating identities. Regionally, it “relieves” Hamas Palestinians in Gaza. It gives Syria a fantastic window of opportunity to come back as a peacemaker to Lebanon and allows the Iranians to disrupt the nuclear issue. The advantages, as you can see, are numerous.
NP: And for the Israelis?
JLV: The “disproportionate” nature of the Israeli response matches the stakes: to definitively rid themselves of the operational capabilities of an Islamist movement that has sworn the destruction of the State of Israel while taking the international community as a witness to the provocation that the country has been the victim of.
NP: Why this exacerbation of violence?
JLV: When you live in the West, it is sometimes difficult to gauge the hatreds accumulated in this part of the world. Stemming from these centers of local, or very localized tension, these hatreds reach us more diluted but remain sometimes strong enough to provoke in our lands vocations for warriors or avengers. During my stays in Lebanon, but also on my travels in Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, I have always been struck by the inherent violence of these regions. If I left Lebanon in 2004, with regret I must say as this country is particularly “endearing,” it was also because the tension was especially palpable on a day-to-day basis. The assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, followed – but also preceded – by many other opponents to Syria, unfortunately confirmed this impression. In this regard, I have a poignant thought for my late friend and journalist Samir Kassir.
NP: You are well acquainted with Lebanon? Can you tell us what a pacified Lebanon looked like?
JLV: The term “pacified” sounds strangely enough as it appears foreign to the contemporary situation of the Cedar country, at least since the war of 1975. And yet, Lebanon has all the prerequisites of a terrestrial paradise: climate, geographical location to which are added the kindness and legendary hospitality of the Lebanese people. One can understand the fascination of Westerners for this country, particularly for Beirut. It must not be forgotten that this capital of pleasure, a colossal panem et circenses, is also set up as an illusion to keep in the country a youth of which more than a third is struggling ingeniously to be able to leave it. This must mean something. Not to mention the political and religious tensions that were undermining, well before the current tragedy, the future politics of the country.
NP: What has changed, then?
JLV: Fifteen years of precarious peace after fifteen years of fratricidal conflicts have not succeeded—as we still see today—in smoothing fundamental oppositions, in sanitizing irreducible contradictions, almost “civilizational” which had made the country’s wealth as long as they were not used to exacerbate the “narcissism of small differences.” Whatever their confessions, all Lebanese families recall those blessed times when Christians, Druzes, and Muslims lived in the same building in good intelligence and in harmony conducive to mutual enrichment. The manipulation of these differences, the external political and religious interferences have definitely sealed a rift that leads Lebanon to flirt with disintegration every second of its ordinary life. The “Lebanon with two faces,” so dear to the poet, seems to me now a myth. A part of Lebanon turns its gaze towards the West, the other towards Arabness, with strong underlying religious pressures. Without falling into the clichés of Samuel Huntington on the “clash of civilizations,” I think today there are two Lebanons which are difficult to reconcile.
NP: We discover with this major conflict the impotence of the Lebanese Government in the face of Hezbollah’s actions. Why is this happening? What exact role does Hezbollah play in Lebanon?
JLV: I know that the time is for human tragedy and compassion for the victims, both Lebanese and Israeli. But also, as Plutarch, act as “true friend” and not “base flatterer” telling the other, Lebanese or Israelis, what they do not necessarily want to listen to. The history of politics in Lebanon seems to be, to plagiarize the sociologist Pareto, a “cemetery of aristocracies,” with sons succeeding fathers and widows to husbands. The former Rector of St Joseph University regularly denounced the archaism of the political system—the confessionalism—directly inspired by the Ottoman Empire and regretted the absence of a strong rule of law capable of imposing on all religious communities a unified civil code.
NP: So, the problem is not new?
JLV: Indeed. The political system of Lebanon as a whole can be summed up as an ancestral feudal pattern with clientelistic connections. In this context, competence and legitimacy are defined by the control of a territorial area, by the influence of a surname or financial power. Not a rule of law where principles apply to all, but a bond of allegiance and clan—Assabiyah in Arabic—that led the former Minister of Culture Ghassam Salame to wonder if it did not “make democracy a prisoner”. Political reversals are frequent, depending on the situations day by day, in short, a politics of successive truths. Let’s cite the most striking case: General Aoun, exfiltrated by French services in 1990 spent fifteen years of his life in exile. During these fifteen years, he never ceased to vigorously denounce the Syrian grip on his country to the point that, during a trip to the United States, he managed to convince the American Senate to vote for heavy sanctions against Damascus. A few months after his return to Lebanon, he signs, for electoral considerations, an agreement with the most pro-Syrian formation there is, Hezbollah, which had driven him from his native village, Haret Hreik. “A thousand arrangements, never a defeat,” says the Shiite proverb! Since 1989, the date of the Taef Accords which ended the civil war in Lebanon, powers are distributed according to a confessional principle: a Christian Maronite president, a Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shiite president of the Chamber. Between these three teams formed to direct a single harness, the Lebanese state, one can guess, cannot move forward without being torn apart. Hezbollah has managed to take a large advantage of this paralyzing system by developing a remarkable policy of proximity in education, construction, and health, often intended to compensate for the shortcomings of the Lebanese state.
NP: What is the history of Hezbollah?
JLV: Hezbollah was born from a split within the Shiite Amal movement that occurred in 1982, at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In a few Shiite hamlets in southern Lebanon as in other villages in the region, Marjeyoun and Jezzine for example, with the notable exception of Sidon, the inhabitants, exasperated by the mishaps due to the Palestinian presence, sometimes welcomed the soldiers of Tsahal as “liberators”. More radical, the pro-Iranian inclination displayed by the “Party of God” hardly conceals the origins of a movement essentially intended to oppose its competitor Amal in a never-soothed rivalry between Shiites from the Plateau of Hermel and those from South Lebanon. To the point of celebrating separately the great Shiite feast of Ashura.
NP: And today?
JLV: During my stays in Lebanon, I met Hassan Nasrallah and frequently discussed with one of his advisors, the current Deputy of Bekaa Hossein Hadj Hassan. Before the departure of the Israelis in June 2000, Hezbollah’s official doctrine aimed to transform it into a political party. Endowed with a certain aura after the departure of Tsahal from southern Lebanon, with a high degree of political structuring, probably one of the best in the Lebanese political landscape, the fundamentalist formation indeed attempted to follow this logic. But, if I may say, the symbolic reward of militantism did not “pay”. Funding by Iran and support from Syria required ground actions that greatly exceeded the scope of Lebanese politics. Whether it be the Secretary-General or Deputy Hadj Hassan, the rhetoric was the same: there will always be a goal to reach and thus an action to carry out. The struggle against American imperialism, the question of the return of Palestinians to their occupied lands, and the conquest of Jerusalem represented as many slogans likely to delay the entry into national political ranks. By securing, with the support of Syria and Iran, the privilege of keeping its weapons, this line has provided the “Party of God” with visibility capable of galvanizing the mobilization of Shiite fighters and has secured it an “untouchable” place, so to speak, until the departure of the Syrians in 2005.
NP: Hasn’t the “Lebanese revolution” changed the situation?
JLV: Only halfway. The tipping of the Sunnis into the camp of opposition to the Syrians has made the Shiites politically a minority despite their demographic advantage. Hezbollah has only become more essential to Damascus. It was noticeable during the counter-demonstrations organized in Beirut at the time of adopting United Nations resolution 1559 calling for its disarmament and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the border of Lebanon with Israel. Even after the departure of the Syrians, such an initiative by the Lebanese Government could have led to a civil war. I remember the scale of the celebrations, by Hezbollah, of “Jerusalem Day.” The presence of impressive combat units, including those of very young children and the striking demonstrations of commandos, function as a reminder of its military capabilities. The “regular” troops that greet the Head of State the next day during the Lebanese national independence day celebration contrast with their singular modesty.
NP: How do you understand the American position of support for Israel? What consequences will this have on the conflict?
JLV: This support has been a constant of American policy in the region. It is likely that the United States closely monitors the degree of tolerance of public opinion on this “benevolent neutrality” granted to Israeli military operations in Lebanon, especially in the event of a ground operation. If, under the Bush presidency, a progressive but real disengagement took place on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American embassy has been much more active in Lebanon, and this, well before the assassination of Rafic Hariri.
NP: How do populations live through the bombings, the blockade, this tension, and the return to war?
JLV: Initially, there was a reaction of hostility, except in the Shiite suburbs of Beirut, to the actions of Hezbollah. A large majority of Lebanese, not only Christians but also the great Sunni families of Tripoli (not those imported in the baggage of the Syrian army) as well as some secularized Shiite groups in the suburbs, are in favor of good relations with the State of Israel. During the Syrian hold, this majority remained silent, any idea of peace with Israel being akin to “collaboration with the enemy.” At the risk of shocking under the current circumstances, many of my Lebanese friends believe—even some to be pleased, others to condemn—that Israel is performing the “dirty work” secretly wished for by many of the country’s political leaders as well as by a large part of the international community. All eyes are now turned to the Sunnis to see whether they will remain—or not—in opposition as Tsahal operations and the subsequent suffering on the population intensify. In any case, it will be all the more difficult, under these conditions, to bring Hezbollah to repentance: it positively crystallizes on itself the feelings of frustration and vengeance just as it knows it is now fighting for its survival as both a political and military force.
NP: What do the Lebanese expect, according to you, from France?
JLV: The calls for a ceasefire and the creation of humanitarian corridors are certainly useful to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the population. But they will not solve the fundamental problem. It is true that a form of emotional attachment, of symbiotic relationship exists, for historical reasons, between the two countries. But it is appropriate not to exaggerate their importance. Lebanese Christians have often felt “neglected” by Paris in favor of a pro-Syrian regime that favored Sunnis and Shiites. Until the assassination of Rafic Hariri. It is not wrong to say that France was particularly disappointed with President Bashar Al-Assad in whom she had placed hopes for a liberalization in Syria, profitable, in return, to Lebanese political life. For Hezbollah, it’s much the same feeling: Paris likened it to a regular component of the political chessboard in Lebanon in the hope that it would abandon armed struggle. One may regret on this subject as on that of the personality of Arafat, dropped by Washington as soon as he appeared incapable of controlling radical Palestinian Islamic movements, a French resistance to take note of certain realities. An anecdote will summarize my thought. At the traditional end of the Francophonie Summit in Beirut in October 2002—not so long ago—students from St Joseph University were protesting against the Syrian presence. During the press conference, journalists mainly addressed their questions to President Jacques Chirac. Out of modesty, he then addressed them to the other official representatives. A daring journalist publicly asked the question of the French position on the relations between Syria and Lebanon. A frozen silence suddenly filled the room. The President dodged the question. In some way, he put Syria and Lebanon on an equal footing in the name of non-interference in the internal affairs of both States. In a corner of the room, a small pro-Syrian group began to applaud loudly. Diplomatically perfect. Politically, it may have lacked the inspiration and the breath of a City Hall balcony to allow it to rise to the rank of History… Diplomacy and politics do not always mix well.
