The extent of the blockades in France these days inevitably raises the question of the limits of the right to strike. As always, the rights of some seem to encroach on those of others, and it is necessary to rely on firm principles to make balanced decisions. How far can we reconcile the freedom to strike with the exercise of other freedoms?
According to John Rawls, in his Theory of Justice, a political measure is acceptable if and only if it respects a hierarchy of norms characteristic of our democratic justice: first, according to the principle of equal liberties, “each person has an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties system, compatible with the same set of liberties for all members of society.” The second principle, subordinate to the first, states that “economic and social inequalities must be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals” and contribute to the realization of “equality of opportunity.”
Consequently, if a reform contravenes the hierarchy of norms described by Rawls, disobedience is justified. In this regard, the strike, a collective and intentional work stoppage, can be understood as a form of civil disobedience. More precisely, this act seems legitimate according to Rawls, as long as “the duty to obey laws enacted by a legislative majority” ceases to be “an obligation in the face of the right to defend one’s freedoms and the duty to fight against injustice.” Thus, the power of the street is not necessarily anti-democratic!
The limit of the strike is then less a matter of political legitimacy than of individual rights: everyone must be able to retain the freedom… not to strike. How, for example, can picket lines be tolerated? (as seen with the RATP when striking agents closed the gates of certain stations to prevent passengers from accessing the few metros in service!). According to Hayek, in his work The Constitution of Liberty, “the aura of legitimacy” that surrounds certain strike methods “because the objectives pursued are often approved of, does not change the fact that they constitute a form of organized pressure on individuals,” pressure that is contrary to the rule of law. In other words, it is less the right to strike than the way it is implemented that poses a question: “because the strike was recognized as a legitimate weapon (…), it has led to the belief that it is acceptable to use any method to make a strike successful.” In this, the end cannot justify all means.
If this strike is destined to continue, care must be taken to ensure it does not descend into anarchy, but respects the very principles of law that make it possible…
Juliette Courtillé, Time to Philo (Telos)
