Three dates, seemingly innocuous, in the political life of several countries. Three electoral deadlines whose outcomes will nevertheless determine much of the regional, if not global, stability. Windows of opportunity for some, abysses of insecurity for others. A crucial period indeed begins with the Israeli Knesset elections on February 10th. Far from concluded, unless considering “Shock and Awe” as a strategic end, the military intervention by the IDF in Gaza, decided by the outgoing government, was not devoid of electoral afterthoughts, whatever may be said. These did not prevent the right-wing leader Benjamin Netanyahu from remaining a favorite in the polls. What remains to be seen is the true dimension—whether internal use or signaling a military operation—of the Likud leader’s statements that “Iran will not have the nuclear bomb.” Beyond electoral speculation, two factors remain crucial: the Israeli services still hold the year 2010 as the deadline beyond which Tehran will have the means to develop a nuclear weapon. Moreover, it is unthinkable that the United States would not intervene in the event of a unilateral action by the State of Israel where its survival is at stake.
The second date is that of the legislative elections in Lebanon scheduled for June 7, 2009. The moment of truth for this country where two radical political visions clash: that of the March 14 coalition and that sympathetic to Syria, allied to Hezbollah. While the latter was leading in August last year, the professional union elections at the end of the year surprised with a movement largely in favor of the current majority camp. However, it is to be feared that these deadlines will satisfy no one: in the event of a victory of the current governmental coalition, the Shiite militia, which has never surrendered its arms, could decide to regain its full freedom of action against the State of Israel. A freedom to which it voluntarily imposed limits during the recent war in the Gaza Strip in order not to frighten still undecided voters and to preserve its claim to integrate into the Lebanese institutional political game. In case of a victory for the March 8 forces and Hezbollah, the latter will have all the “national legitimacy” to possibly undertake ground actions at the behest of Tehran, the only authority, in the end, that its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledges. With dramatic consequences for the country of the Cedars. And, one suspects, for the entire region.
Five days later, the presidential elections in Iran will be held. The ambiguity of the candidacy declarations is carefully maintained by all political actors: the much-desired candidacy of former president Khatami seems already undermined by the official participation of Mehdi Karoubi, also a former president of the Majlis and perceived as a reformer, while the explicit support of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for the incumbent President Ahmadinejad—still very popular in small towns and some provinces—does not necessarily lessen the uncertainties about the instructions given by the Guide to the Council of the Guardians of the Revolution, responsible for the screening of candidates.
Between February 10 and June 12, between the “Iranian fist” to be loosened and the “extended hand” of the United States, the maneuvering room for the American President remains, as seen, particularly narrow. While the White House has already named and set to work two special envoys—one for the Middle East, the other for the Pakistan-Afghanistan zone—the official designation and defining the mission for the one who should be in charge of a dialogue with Iran—Denis Ross—lags behind. A delay that is not the least sign of the complexity of this file.
