Our friend and collaborator Macarie Dagry sends us this contribution concerning the political news in Côte d’Ivoire.
For all keen observers of Ivorian political life, it was evident that the former Ivorian president would see through his strategy. It is considered by some as suicidal and by others as courageous. Perhaps it is both at once. It is deeply rooted in convictions and certainties that rendered any other logic inconceivable and unacceptable.
Advised by numerous evangelist pastors of questionable morality and well-stocked bank accounts, as well as the most fearsome hawks of his clan “fired up” by his wife, L. Gbagbo, as a seasoned “political animal,” locked into considerations of “strategic finality” recognized by many political observers, quickly understood the advantage he could gain from this post-electoral Ivorian disaster, which was increasingly closing in on him like a deadly trap.
After many years of intense and relentless political battles, his sly rise to power gave him the feeling of an extraordinary destiny that should lead him into the Great History of Côte d’Ivoire. As a historical and determined opponent, L. Gbagbo built himself undeniable legitimacy through his brutal and courageous power struggle with President Félix Houphouët Boigny, whom he fought against until his death. This obsessive determination, which ultimately resulted in many human lives lost in 2000, significantly reinforced his conviction that “one must never give up and fight to the gates of hell.”
In this logic, the mental construction of his personality leads him to consider that a cause deemed lost in advance can always be turned to his advantage, provided he exploits all areas of uncertainty and the weaknesses of others. This is what he skillfully did between 2005 and 2010 by arranging to postpone the presidential election six times. He did not hide his assertion that “if I had known that money could buy men, I wouldn’t have invested so much in weapons.” Unfortunately, no one paid attention to this statement. One advantage we can acknowledge about L. Gbagbo is that he often announces in advance what he will do, followed by the phrase “I had warned.” On several occasions, he warned that he would give the order to fire on opposition protesters demanding elections. He did this without concern. We still remember the massacre of 2004 in Abidjan. Before the first round of the election, which witnessed President Ouattara’s victory, he had warned, “I’m here, and I will stay.” Yet again, no attention was given.
As a historian fascinated by the legends of “Great Men” in history, it is not impossible that he orchestrated in his “all-powerfulness” his own end of reign in chaos. Realizing increasingly his solitude and the inefficiency of his multiple international networks that assured him that the international community would eventually relent, doubt began to invade him. The supposed divine revelations of his pastors, which firmly consolidated his convictions of a “Unique Destiny,” enclosed him in megalomaniac illusions. They crumbled as pressure and the military siege closed in on him. Therefore, once more, like a true chess player, he needed to have a move in advance and stage an exit hoping to make headlines worldwide.
Caught in his trap of this post-electoral crisis rotting, L. Gbagbo positioned himself as a “Martyr.” Faced with this brutal reality shaking years of certainties and illusions, which finally created schizophrenic confusions in his mind, to preserve the myth of the “warrior,” “liberator of the African continent” against the colonizer, he chose extreme confrontation.
Since the Marcoussis peace accords in 2003, despite fluctuating relations between open conflicts and seduction with France (numerous contracts awarded, Bolloré, Bouygues, Total, Vinci, Veolia, etc.), he has always been careful not to cross the mirror’s other side. Those abyssal depths where returning becomes nearly impossible. L. Gbagbo maintained obscure relations with the ex-colonial power, like a disappointed lover but always hopeful. It is no secret. This man admires France, where he undertook part of his university studies. He lived there and even married a French woman with whom he had his son Michel. Despite his numerous friendships in France, his fascination for great French thinkers and politicians, he always regretted that the ex-colonial power did not treat him with the same respect.
Caught in his trap of this post-election crisis decay, confronted with himself, tormented internally by this compulsive desire to enter the Grand History of this wounded country today, L. Gbagbo chose to position himself as a “Martyr” of the ex-colonial power. He, the Bété, the people who resisted and fought the French during colonization, threw himself body and soul into a highly risky, yet thoughtful and calculated adventure. His goal was to inscribe in the collective unconscious of the Bété people and Côte d’Ivoire as the one who resisted and fought with courage and determination against the “White” invader and colonizer. By deciding to target the UN and notably France, the former opponent to the “Old Man” knew he would find resonance among some Ivorian and African intellectuals, for whom France would remain forever the unique source of all their misfortunes. This strategy seemed to have resonated particularly among some Cameroonian intellectuals who embarked on this cause by taking a stand for the “defender” of African dignity. Calixte Béyala and Gaston Kelman remain the main supporters of the former Head of State in this post-electoral crisis. After his fall, one can hope they would do the same in Cameroon, their country of origin, with as much vehemence against Paul Biya, who again and again prepares to succeed himself, in complete indifference, after nearly 30 years of power.
Gbagbo placed himself as the worthy successor of the illustrious Kragbé Gnagbé.
By firing rocket shots at the French embassy, then the Japanese one with armed men inside its premises, and subsequently the Mauritanian one, L. Gbagbo knew the response would be violent and immediate. As if these acts were not enough to provoke indignation and condemnation from the international community, he resorted to, like Al Qaeda, the method of foreigners’ abduction to provoke a brutal and rapid reaction, especially from France, whose two nationals were among the abducted persons. Worse still, his militiamen started burning West African nationals alive in acts of provocations. This forced leaders of countries of origin of the victims to toughen their stance and demand a UN resolution to end these abuses.
The response expected by Gbagbo therefore matched his hopes. That is, quick, violent, and targeted while remaining within the legal framework imposed by UN resolution 1975. As a fine connoisseur of French political life, he knew his strategy would provoke intense debate within the French political class, a year before the presidential election. Again, his wishes were fulfilled. The controversy rages in France. The socialist party, where he has many supporters, is all claws out, attempting to exploit this shadowy area orchestrated by “comrade” Gbagbo to trouble President Sarkozy, already weakened nationally. By creating this chaos and disaster, he also strategically aimed to make arrival to power of the newly elected president as “calamitous” as his was in 2000.
All Ivorians, particularly the Bété people, will long remember the humiliating and degrading images of the Gbagbo couple in full downfall. He, the child of Mama, whom pastors and spiritual guides predicted an extraordinary future for the “liberation of African peoples,” knows those disastrous images of him in just an undershirt could contribute to build his legend over time. We recall during the post-electoral crisis, his wife and supporters dared to compare him to Patrice Lumumba. We all remember the humiliating and violent images of the demise of this independence hero of the Congolese people. The “Myth and Legend” were then under construction. The historian in him knows that myths and legends are often built on acts of resistance that are then amplified, distorted, and inscribed in the collective memory of people who always need historical references to continue the political battle.
In true opportunistness, hungry for eternal glory, Gbagbo positioned himself as the worthy successor of the illustrious Kragbé Gnagbé. The Bété population massacre in the 1969-70 by Félix Houphouët Boigny’s army left indelible traces in the Bété collective unconscious. To capture this regime opponent, Houphouët’s army did not hesitate to massacre a population that refused to reveal Gnagbé’s hideout. He has become a genuine myth and a symbol of resistance and struggle against France, which supported the “Old Man’s” action against the Bétés. Simone, the “Lady of Blood,” quickly understood the advantage in building herself a “political fighter” legend, anchored in faith and belief, like a Joan of Arc. The images of this woman, co-founder of FPI with her husband, disheveled, surrounded by soldiers who ruined their glory by assaulting her, could only strengthen her supporters’ myth-building over time and space.
