Contrary to appearances, the visit of the Iranian president to Lebanon would rather please the detractors of Hezbollah. One should actually speak of two visits: the first, official, took on the appearance of a mutual admiration society where the worst enemies congratulate each other in front of the cameras. Organized outside state protocol, the second, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tour of south Lebanon, aimed to reaffirm Tehran’s support for Hezbollah. A support that was particularly publicized, in stark contrast to the usual discretion about its ties with Iran that the Shiite militia has displayed since its creation in 1982. This raises questions.
Despite the fears it incites, this grand spectacle – schools in the southern suburb closed without any directive from the Lebanese Ministry of Education, roads blocked by the Shiite militia’s security services without consultation with competent authorities – paradoxically confirms a weakening of the Party of God. Stuck while awaiting the publication of an indictment by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah has been multiplying televised appearances and press conferences since last August to try to discredit the Prosecutor: since the Islamic militia has now embraced the hypothesis of an indictment by the international judicial body, it tries by all means to change the course of history within Lebanon: futile revelations about a possible Israeli involvement in Rafic Hariri’s assassination, highlighting the affair of the “false witnesses,” insistence on the “politicization” of the STL, and calls for the creation of a Lebanese court to handle this case. Hezbollah’s last option is to bring down Saad Hariri’s government by withdrawing its ministers and creating a “vacuum” that would prevent any external process from succeeding. With the fears expressed by the Commander-in-chief of the Army, Jean Kahwagi, to the special UN envoy for Lebanon: “from whom would I then receive my orders?” Concerns heard beyond the Cedar country.
Despite the display of unwavering support from the entire Shiite community for the Iranian president’s escapade, Hezbollah cannot ignore, another source of concern, the recurring rivalries with its “brothers” of the Amal Movement: grassroots militants who bicker or fight with those of Hezbollah during local electoral deadlines are joined by the whisper, by the most influential adviser of the Speaker of Parliament, that Nabih Berry would not mind restoring his influence in the Lebanese institutional triumvirate and regaining the ear of Damascus, lost after 2005. Solidarity always has its limits. This is evidenced by the example of mayors of small villages in south Lebanon affiliated with the Party of God who reject any subsidy, for educational or health purposes, originating from France, in order to stigmatize the overly zealous French contingents of UNIFIL in their search and discovery of weapons caches. The local representatives of Amal do not complain about it and take advantage of the available resources without qualms. As for the wealthy Shiite families, they are hardly “interested” in a new conflict with Israel and they have made this known to Hezbollah leaders.
Another sign of the weakening of the Party of God: financial issues. Several corruption cases, including a genuine “Hezbollahi Madoff,” have poisoned the Shiite militia in recent months: while junior officers ensure, under difficult conditions due to the clandestinity, the operational training of fighters in the south of the country and in the Bekaa, others enjoy lavish lifestyles, betrayed by their luxury cars speeding through the southern suburbs of Beirut. On several occasions, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah has had to firmly remind the most extravagant to order. These reminders are all the more necessary as the Party is experiencing liquidity crises, forcing some of its businessmen abroad to hurriedly sell their businesses to refill the coffers and ensure the fluidity of allegiances.
Even if it means renouncing its destiny neurosis – how to exist without necessarily perishing as a martyr? – the Shiite militia seems, for the moment, to rule out a military option with unpredictable consequences. To a Western diplomat who questioned him at the start of the summer about his reactions in case of indictment, a Hezbollah official had at that time responded that the Party of God was hesitating between two scenarios: “July 2006 or May 2008.” The first referring to the war against the IDF, the second to the blocking of Beirut’s international airport and street fighting. But already under pressure inside Lebanon, the party’s temptation for arms, suicidal notwithstanding the serious damage likely to be inflicted on Israel, is now locked at the regional level. Including by its own allies. Concerned about a conflict where, for the first time, the Alawite regime could be threatened, and lacking credibility by having metaphorically “sold out those who bought it,” Syria is reduced to a mere role of security subcontractor, forced both to placate Riyadh and to court Washington without betraying Tehran! With Paris, things are simpler: Damascus “eats the bait then spits on the fisherman.”
As for Iran, despite its desire to appear as an unavoidable actor in the region, one can finally wonder what kind of aid Ahmadinejad could have promised to Hezbollah, as his country faces an unprecedented economic crisis despite its monthly oil revenues of several billion dollars. And which, according to a confidential report published by “Les Echos,” raises fears of an imminent financial collapse that attempts to thwart the abandonment – continuously announced and then postponed – of subsidized prices for energy products. In this “misery,” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad urges Iranians to tighten their belts. To Hezbollah, only close ranks.
