Ultimately, these purely “regional elections with regional consequences” were not so! And if the UMP thought it could digest or even erase its defeat with a simple “technical reshuffle” of its government, it must now bitterly recognize that the results of this event clearly marked the start of the presidential campaign for 2012: eager to quickly capitalize on a victory, which remains all the more uncertain nationally as it is still haunted by the specter of the 35 hours, Martine Aubry announced for mid-2011, primaries that will designate the Socialist Party’s presidential candidate and in which “all citizens who wish to participate” can do so. On the right, published surveys have just dashed the slim hopes of Alain Juppé, the first potential candidate, while Dominique de Villepin refuses to go through the “party machine.” Again on the right, conservative leaders are leaking ambiguous remarks and paternalistic recommendations in the press. Others are not so concerned with this sweet diplomacy: UMP senator Alain Lambert condemns “methods” that Nicolas Sarkozy “believes good for the past three years” and that lead the right “straight into the abyss.” He particularly stigmatizes the “court spirit” that fuels anti-Sarkozy sentiment. Defeated in the Paca region, Vaucluse deputy Thierry Mariani feels he has been “taken for a fool.” Punctuated by public comments from his private entourage, generally not very encouraging about a possible second term, speculations about the real or supposed intentions of the President of the Republic are multiplying. That says it all.
Does the five-year term system alone explain this accelerated dynamic of intentions, this early excitement of electoral logics? Perhaps it is also necessary to question a form of impatience among voters, often forgotten once their electoral duty is fulfilled? Far from having exhausted the function of “pulsional discharge” – the relief of an ad hoc sanction vote not calling into question traditional support – these regional elections, it is anticipated, have initiated a fundamental movement whose consequences are difficult to predict. Will it fizzle out along the way? Nicolas Sarkozy, evidently crystallizing on his person, irreversibly associated with his actions due to his mode of governance, a significant part of the discontent, will he be able to harness the energy? Will he manage, through a spectacular measure, a Gaullist announcement to undermine the current? Since it is risky for him to act realistically on the economy and world affairs, will he find the means in domestic politics? Let us dare a carefully provocative hypothesis: a decision, for example, to strictly prohibit all cumulations of mandates would have considerable impact, politically understandable, and capable of winning back a public opinion largely doubtful of him. Additionally, it would open the door to new generations it could mobilize while breaking the fairly widespread feeling of a country of political leaders with the highest average age in Europe. One can already anticipate the numerous resistances from the many concerned!
By 2012, if it is not already too late, the head of state will have to solve a triple equation. First, he will need to decide on a more presidential political strategy that does not rely solely on political tactics, then establish a reform pace that does not derive solely from daily news, and finally choose a governmental team that escapes only to the circumstances of useful alliances and momentary affective preferences. Three questions that undoubtedly challenge his temperament, and reflectively, his now tarnished image of an assertive president. A correlation that is not without risk but also not without benefit. Provided that the head of state manages to convince himself of it.
