A good sailor detests two situations: firstly, the calm, that lack of wind that makes navigation impossible, a tedious wait that also wears down the crew’s morale. Secondly, he abhors the storm that escapes all control. However, the old sea dog might sometimes prefer the latter to the former as it gives him, at his own risk, the sensation of regaining his ability to maneuver. The boldest even call for swells and storms when the risk of mutiny onboard increases. The “bad storm” that threatens the ship’s solidity diverts the sailors’ anger, mobilizes their energies, and unites them behind their captain.
Since the summer announcement of his security shift, Nicolas Sarkozy has, for several weeks, seemed to be multiplying – perhaps deliberately? – gale occurrences. Has the head of state chosen to steer through rough seas to counter rebellion? It is true that the internal political climate has considerably worsened with the cascading revelations of the Woerth-Bettencourt affair: these strengthen, during a period of crisis, the dual impression of inequality and impunity of a political class increasingly entrenched in its own profits at the expense of those designated by the general interest. Additionally, the still-distant presidential deadline has already triggered the electoral countdown, fueling insubordination tendencies within the UMP itself. Finally, while the head of state continues to lose points in the polls, the anticipated government reshuffle has become a real headache, where the appreciated personality of the Prime Minister contradicts the politically appeasing virtue of a change at Matignon. This shows that there is no lack of arguments in favor of a presidential strategy.
Just as it is practiced with the same radicality in other European Union countries without stirring the slightest criticism, the policy of expelling Roma camps has existed for a long time in France. It is indeed the Elysée’s intention to give it political exposure that has initiated the storm. The recent “clashes” between Nicolas Sarkozy and high-ranking European officials during the last Brussels summit could also be part of this ambitious strategy. A poll indicated this week that the French hate the euro. The step from the euro to Europe is minimal and advantageous with public opinion.
Without casting aspersions, a “storm” within France would not, in any case, disserve the Elysée’s logic either. Within a week, Bernard Squarcini gave two interviews to JDD and Le Monde, in which he reiterated the idea of the imminence of a “major” terrorist attack against France. Known for his professionalism, it is unlikely that the Director of the Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence would allow himself to publicly share such alarming conclusions on his own. The Islamist threat exists – the kidnapping of national expatriates in Niger attests to this – and the figure put forward by the head of French counter-espionage on “an average of two thwarted attacks per year in France by his services” is certainly below the reality. But shouldn’t it be the interior minister to testify to this? Isn’t the public intervention of an expert from the shadows attempting to dramatize its effects artificially?
And what if, tomorrow, war breaks out in the Middle East while all indicators are red in Lebanon as the publication of the indictment from the Special Tribunal charged with judging Rafic Hariri’s assassins approaches, as Russia agrees to sell cruise missiles to Syria, and as Iran still doesn’t yield to the international community’s injunctions on its uranium enrichment? Will we have to, like a Third Republic Council President after the 1918 conflict, admit “not having wished for it but having seen it coming with a secret hope?”
