Will Israeli forces wait only until the end of Ramadan—and the United Nations General Assembly from September 23 to 30—to launch a ground offensive against Hezbollah? The recent denials from Javier Solana, who is responsible for EU security and foreign policy issues, about the risks of conflict with the Hebrew state are hard to believe given the numerous factors supporting this dangerous hypothesis.
Lebanese politicians, foreign diplomats stationed there, and United Nations security officials in Lebanon all seem informed about the military preparations of the Israeli Defense Forces: a particularly detailed plan has appeared in the press these days, mentioning a ground offensive consisting of 62,000 men intended to put an end to the actions of the Shiite militia, whose several tens of thousands of rockets are aimed at the north of the Hebrew state. Since its bitter failure in the summer of 2006, the Israeli army knows it cannot avoid a significant engagement of its soldiers on the ground. Consequently, it has equipped its tanks with new anti-missile weaponry, specialists explain. They also point out the establishment of a brigade that is specially trained in the psychology of Hezbollah fighters. Furthermore, these plans envisage a vast ground offensive extending deep into the Bekaa Valley to compel the international community to set up an interposition force at the Syrian border, if only to control the “84 crossing points between the two countries,” which, according to a UN official, “are not necessarily used for arms trafficking but probably contribute to it.”
In disbelief, ordinary Lebanese people shrug their shoulders in a sign of helplessness. However, these threats are taken very seriously by the Party of God: orders for intensified military preparation, coupled with a massive recruitment of young Shiites in the south of the country, attest to this, with some contingents sent to Iran for training.
Risking further escalations, the internal Lebanese political situation benefits in no way from the lull provided by the Ramadan period. Three months after the parliamentary elections, the Lebanese government is still not formed. Despite a vote with fairly uncontestable results in favor of the March 14 coalition, Saad Hariri has not been able to bring himself to lead a government formed solely from the majority, seeking under the misleading term of “national unity” an option largely imposed on the ground by the political reality of Hezbollah’s arms. Stalled negotiations, countless opposition escalations fueled by Syria, which finds in them—in spite of the forced and complacent satisfaction granted by Bernard Kouchner to Damascus—a nuisance capability to avenge itself on the independence desire of its small neighbor. Bashar al-Assad, as usual, plays on multiple fronts: arsonists in Iraq evoking Baghdad’s diplomatic ire, good offices with Iran to boost his credit with Westerners, while letting himself be courted by the latter to adopt, against promises of negotiations on the Golan, a very uncertain “neutrality” towards Hezbollah in the event of a conflict between the militia and Israel. Syria nonetheless incites its allies in Lebanon to resume its rare violent attacks against the Special Tribunal as the first summonses of Hezbollah and Syrian officials loom in The Hague. During one of their visits to Beirut, STL officials thus studied with local UN heads the replay of the May 2008 catastrophic scenario when Party of God militiamen blocked Beirut International Airport for several days.
Against a backdrop of Israeli-Palestinian uncertainties, Iranian nuclear deadlines, Egyptian trials against Hezbollah networks, and Saudi displeasure towards Syrian intransigence, the Middle Eastern imbroglio seems to be at its peak. It is safe to say that Barack Obama’s announced peace initiative for the 64th session of the United Nations seems very uncertain.
