As Nicolas Sarkozy spectacularly reconnects with Syria, he will need to adopt one of the main virtues of diplomacy in the East: patience. Without any guaranteed reward in the end. Although the President of the Republic cannot be blamed for his attempt, it will take more than an official platform on July 14 to successfully distance Damascus from Tehran. During their press conference, Bashar Al Assad’s response, dismissing in a single sentence the French president’s request regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions, was unambiguous. It could only align with a philosophy of an agreement reached earlier in the year between the Iranian and Syrian defense ministers, which defines “Israel and the United States” as “common enemies.” At the signing of the document, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar stated that “Iran considers Syria’s security as its own” and clarified that “Iran’s defense capabilities are at Syria’s disposal.” Anticipating the French initiative, Iran’s ambassador to London, Rasoul Movahedian, suggested that the West was “wasting its time” in demanding the suspension of uranium enrichment.
If they confirm, with the range of the new “Shahab 3” missile, the belligerent intentions of the Islamic Republic, the latest Iranian exercises “Great Prophet III” are as much political-military posturing that indicates the narrow dead-end in which Tehran authorities find themselves today, and their subsequent escalations to try to extricate themselves. This is illustrated by the notably radical rhetoric during a recent meeting of a company specialized in high communication technologies in Iran, inevitably controlled by the Revolutionary Guards. Facing expressed fears of war and its impact on business, one of its representatives admitted that a conflict was “very close” while explaining the means available to Tehran for retaliation: “oil and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,” “Hezbollah controlling Lebanon,” “bombs on Israel,” and “attacks in other countries,” citing, for example, “the Channel Tunnel.”
The discourse promoted by the mullahs’ regime on the “priority given to protection against foreign threats” struggles to convince the population. They are well aware that the “sepah-e-pasdaran” work to exaggerate the conditions of this threat to divert the population from genuine discontent. Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Hussein Saffar-Harandi thus had to remind that no “journalist now has the right to criticize the government’s nuclear options” on pain of imprisonment. Former President Khatami or supporters of the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, Hachemi Rafsanjani, are regularly accused of “treason” when they attempt to explain that “Iran does not need this tension and that war is not a necessity.” This is a sign of rivalries within a regime that nonetheless cannot divide itself at the risk of losing all power, with the war and the blocking of websites — baztab.com, rajanews.com — run by different protagonists.
While President Ahmadinejad had promised Iranians to bring “the benefits of oil to their table,” the government has now considered ending the subsidies benefiting fuel prices — officially to redistribute the amounts to the most needy — and suggested that, in a year, prices will be aligned with those on the international market. A full tank of gas could thus increase from 3 to more than a dozen dollars for a minimum monthly salary amounting to around 250. Due to financial restrictions imposed by the international community — Total’s recent decision aligns with this — the oil infrastructures are not able to bridge the gap between the production of 45 million liters of gas per day and the consumption of over 80 million liters across the country. Iranians do not fail to draw parallels between this price surge and the second wave of sanctions adopted for several months by the UN.
While it is futile to hope for the regime to “fall like a ripe fruit,” it is nonetheless evident the difficulties the regime faces in containing the increasing discontent of the civilian population. In Persian language, escalation often precedes openness, exemplified by the “delighted” reaction of the Iranian president to the idea of renewing diplomatic ties between his country and the United States. Beyond the elaborate rhetoric always at work in this part of the world, this announcement could validate the sole politically posthumous victory of the current American president.
