By taking the initiative to convene an extraordinary European Council on Monday regarding the situation in Georgia, Nicolas Sarkozy aims to contribute to the promotion and visibility of a more politically engaged Europe, precisely the one defined by the Lisbon Treaty. We cannot blame him, as the European Union has too often given the disheartening impression of being rather distant from its citizens and failing to act as a true player on the international stage. However, the path seems particularly narrow for a Union displaying “divisions” whose nature, unfortunately, is not such as to influence the masters of the Kremlin.
On one hand, it would be unacceptable to gather the 27 member states only to finally deliver a “firm statement” directed at the Russian leaders. If this were to be the outcome desired by Paris from this meeting, precisely organized in response to the Russian side’s non-compliance with the “six-point agreement,” the EU would once again severely demonstrate a form of political ineptitude and weakness. Moscow, without a doubt, would know how to take advantage on the ground with respect to the Russians in its “near abroad,” while the President of the Republic would not fail to face a flurry of criticism over the ineffectiveness of French diplomacy.
On the other hand, one can perceive the Europeans’ real embarrassment at wielding the weapon of sanctions against Moscow. For several reasons. The first is due to the disparity among the Union’s partners in their energy dependency on Russian gas. Indeed, the overall European average of 40% poorly conceals significant gaps and significant political consequences: practically 100% for the Baltic states, 80% for Poland and the Czech Republic, 65% for Austria, 37% for Germany, and 24% for France. It is difficult under these conditions to converge viewpoints when the new European states have, for historical reasons, a more heightened sensitivity regarding sovereignty. So, one can understand—but not necessarily share—the anxiety of the Baltic states and some Eastern countries, with Poland and the Czech Republic at the forefront, leaning towards intransigence against Moscow. After all, the French governmental confusion over the issue of sanctions—announcement by Bernard Kouchner later denied by the Élysée just hours after—clearly shows the complexity of the task. In Germany too, after Angela Merkel’s decisive tone during her visit to Tbilisi, her foreign minister is evidently advocating for appeasement in agreement with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. Across the Channel, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, however, threatens to “completely reassess Russia’s relations with the Union.” Yet France and Great Britain must accommodate the Kremlin for their international agenda while more coercive measures against Iran loom, impossible without at least a Russian neutrality at the Security Council.
Blocking Russia’s WTO entry, boycotting the Sochi Winter Olympics, or imposing visa restrictions on the country’s economic elite might be debated during this European Council. However, by a priori deferring to the EU-Russia summit on November 14 for the examination of potential sanctions against Kremlin leaders, the European Union has already granted Moscow an additional delay. Nonetheless, this strategy, as reasonable as it may seem, has a cost: ultimately leaving Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin to set the agenda. At the risk of having to make even less consensual decisions in the near future.
