With “growing support among the population,” the Iranian opposition’s “green wave” emerging from the contested elections of June 12 is now contemplating its “future.” What does it observe? According to a close collaborator of one of the opposition leaders, it has “latent support within certain institutions”: during demonstrations, the traditional army and the police force, according to him, have shown a “form of understanding,” if not sympathy, for the population. Immediately following the elections, national police leaders wrote a letter to the Iranian National Security Council explaining their inability to maintain order. The reaction was immediate: officers from the Sepah-e Pasdaran were integrated into the police command. However, the opposition leaders are not unaware that “neither the police nor the army will confront the Revolutionary Guards directly.”
The opposition also notes divergences within the Revolutionary Guards themselves: several officers from this Corps have been arrested for refusing to carry out repressive orders. Finally, as a leader of the “green wave” notes, Iranian families, who enjoy undeniable legitimacy with the regime due to the overwhelming number of martyrs during the war against Iraq, have started to criticize or support it in a more distanced manner. They cite the descendants of Mehdi Bakeri, former commander of the elite “Ashura” Corps, killed in combat against the Iraqis in the province of Khuzestan. His brother Hamid also fell in this war, but his body was never returned to the family, while another brother, Ali, was a victim of the Shah’s regime. Previously claimed as “references” by the mullahs, these figures are now used by opponents to assert “that they did not die in vain.” The attacks by the official newspaper “Kayhan” against these families attest to these developments. The letter sent to the leader Ali Khamenei by the head of official artists Mohammad Nourizad (https://mohammadnurizad.blogfa.com), where he compares Iran’s dismal results to those of Turkey—a severe insult to anyone familiar with the Persian mentality—also signifies the distancing of a fraction of the population from the power.
Lastly, religious figures display their differences too. The first concerned the designation of Eid El Fitr, marking the end of Ramadan: the choice of Sunday by Leader Ali Khamenei was contested by a majority of Shia clerics, a “manifest sign of a complete refusal of allegiance,” according to the opposition. Intense discussions between the Leader and religious figures also marked the choice of slogans that traditionally punctuate the Al Qods Day parade. Furthermore, within the institutions themselves, the proceedings of the “Majlis-e Khobregan,” the “Assembly of Experts,” led by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, reveal, according to this official, a division among its members between staunch regime loyalists, the—increasingly minority—supporters of the unsuccessful presidential candidates of June, and a “large number of undecided.” This situation provides a “considerable potential for change” within this structure, which designates and dismisses the Supreme Leader. Certainly, the opposition does not expect an immediate and abrupt mood swing of this Assembly against the regime. Many of its members “have been involved in financial corruption cases by the Sepah-e Pasdaran,” making them “vulnerable.” This Assembly, which is set to convene shortly, he notes, is “conservative by nature,” not to mention the regime’s harshness, which, since the elections, urges them to exercise the utmost caution.
However, the main obstacle to change and progress of the opposition resides in the regime’s control of the media. Independently of the systematic use of listening equipment for conversations and messages—for which Nokia and Siemens companies are singled out—the opposition denounces the ongoing “brainwashing” and the control over national radio and television by the Revolutionary Guards. The blame lies with Ezatollah Zarghami, an early revolutionary accused of taking part in the assault on the American Embassy in Tehran. He succeeded Ali Larijani, when the latter was appointed as the head of Iran’s National Radio and Television, after becoming the Chief negotiator for Iran’s nuclear talks with the West. “There are people outside Tehran who don’t even know of the Green Movement,” also complains this official, who, however, praises the “high degree of awareness among residents of major cities outside the capital.” “Even in Rasht,” a city whose residents are regularly the subject of jokes in traditional Iranian culture, our interlocutor humorously comments.
This dynamic is causing a shift of the abstentionists from June 12, who refused to vote due to all candidates belonging to the same establishment but have since joined the ranks of the green wave. A “notable change in the political environment,” he further explains, which relies on an apparent paradox: firstly, “the majority of those favorable to the opposition have moved past the questioning of trust in the opponents” and the “fear of a mere power struggle among insiders.” Especially since the opposition leaders know they remain very fragile. “Rafsanjani would have already been arrested if he weren’t protected by popular support,” they affirm. Secondly, contrary to 1979, the population no longer wishes to entrust its destiny to a single charismatic leader. “One had to hear the crowd during Rafsanjani’s Friday prayer last July,” confides this leader: upon his arrival, they shouted that “they would feel betrayed if he did not explicitly side with the opposition”: support, as we see, is “meticulous, conditional but also massive.”
Thus arises an opposition strategy being organized “despite everything”: close coordination and division of roles among different leaders, as demonstrated by the handling of the dossier of prisoners tortured in jail solely by Mehdi Karroubi. This deliberate division of tasks also addresses a pragmatic and sustainability concern: “to establish a movement that does not rely solely on its leaders.”
Nevertheless, two major questions trouble this opposition: the current state of the nuclear issue and that of democracy. On the first issue, the opposition reminds that the regime excels at benefiting from regional violence. The regime’s hardliners considered the war with Iraq a “blessing” and now regard the threat of an Israeli attack on nuclear sites as “the best way to rally around the Leader.” President Ahmadinejad’s provocations against Israel have, moreover, led to a scandalous letter from Mehdi Khazali, whose father, Ayatollah Abolghasem Khazali, is a member of the Assembly of Experts. Mehdi Khazali, a physician, published on his blog ([https://www.drkhazali.net](https://www.drkhazali.net)) a tirade questioning if President Ahmadinejad has a “Jewish agenda” and why he would have hidden his real last name, Seboorchian, a Jewish name. This initiative labeled by many Iranians as “Noon be nerkhe rooz khor,” a turncoat, still signifies the “changing wind” in the air.
Some leaders of the “green wave” even fear that an Israeli military operation could lead to an “ethnic breakup of Iran” and allow the regime to “transfer most of the state’s levers into the hands of the Sepah-e Pasdaran.” They remain aware of the risks of criticism inherent in this idea: of appearing as latent supporters of the regime. Hence the middle course adopted by Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi on this issue: “the current regime policy on this question does not align with the country’s national interests.” Regarding relations with the United States, former President Mohammad Khatami “endures harsh criticisms daily for not advancing this matter.” But “he lacked the necessary means to do so,” continues this conversation partner.
The theme of establishing democracy in Iran also fuels many debates within the opposition. Intellectuals within the movement recognize a problem of “compatibility” between the principle of “Velayat-e faqih,” the government of scholars, and that of democracy. This principle, as well as the structure of the “Shora-ye negahban,” the Guardian Council of the Constitution responsible for validating parliamentary candidacies, are in the oppo opposition’s crosshairs. But “in the long term,” it’s stressed, given that demanding “too much, too soon” could prove “fatal” for the opposition. Meanwhile, they prefer to highlight the “third chapter of the Iranian Constitution,” which guarantees “the power of the people.” Final objectives must be “achievable, admissible, and capable of being supported by the largest part of the population.”
In the meantime, the next step aims to “establish a network of independent communication supports.” Not to create an overseas radio or television in the name of the leaders, as this would “subject the latter to unbearable pressure from the regime.” This spokesperson also rejects the use of Iranian televisions established by the opposition in the United States, deemed “too radical in their demand for regime change” and likely to provoke a complete and utter destruction of the country. The “green wave” rather envisions “multiplying media outlets favorable to the opposition,” with initiatives potentially led by the Iranian diaspora. A significant challenge, considering the nationalist susceptibilities of Iranians concerning the image of their country.
NB: All photographs were taken clandestinely during the “Al Qods” day on September 18 in Tehran. The photographer, who risked arrest, has the author’s sincere thanks.
