By bringing together the various Lebanese political parties around the same discussion table, French diplomacy is undertaking a delicate balancing act this weekend, especially as it occurs under circumstances that the Quai d’Orsay does not hesitate to describe as “very serious”. Beyond the undoubtedly desirable aim of re-establishing dialogue between people who “no longer speak to each other”, how indeed can two more or less homogeneous political factions, themselves influenced by multiple regional players and motivated by radically opposed political perspectives, be reconciled?
This impossible mission further takes on the appearance of a last-minute rescue: the presidential deadline in mid-September imposes a final date to avert a dangerous deadlock. This race against time to avoid the worst-case scenarios for Lebanon carries the risk of wanting to find a solution at all costs. At the further risk, just as catastrophic in the long term, of dragging the country of the Cedar back. With the help of Tehran, which it has solicited for this purpose, France is attempting to bring the Shias, whose representatives collectively left the Government of Fouad Siniora following a disagreement over the conditions for establishing the international tribunal tasked with judging the assassins of Rafic Hariri, back into the executive branch.
But in doing so, doesn’t it risk giving its assent to the return of sectarianism in the pure spirit of Taif? Along with it, the blockages and the perverse mechanisms of a system historically denounced by the Lebanese. Yet the political landscape shows that times have changed. There is now in Lebanon a majority and an opposition that go well beyond the sole dividing line between pro and anti-Syrians, where Muslims and Christians find themselves on both sides: since March 14, 2005, two projects involving two different conceptions of mankind and society and its relations to the world are now “proposed” to the Lebanese, especially for France.
Since the departure of the Syrians and their unilateral vision imposed by force, the political leaders of this country must simply learn that in this modern dialectic of power, the uncontested and popular choice in favor of one of the factions must not lead to the absolute negation of the other. But the opposition must also accept the new rules of the game and not resort to neutralizing the system — or even its “destabilization” — by claiming that its sideline would mean its disappearance. Given its strong establishment in the south of the country and a proximity economic and social policy from which it reaps daily benefits, it would be hard to understand the reasons why Hezbollah would harbor such fears. This can shed light on the French approach to the “Party of God”, whose acts, labeled as “terrorist” by the President of the Republic, did not prevent the Shia militia from being invited to La Celle-Saint-Cloud by the French authorities. This “dual” approach only reflects the inherent ambivalence of Hezbollah, still torn between the temptation of violent ground actions and its inevitable transformation, in the long term and for reasons of credibility, into an authentic political party. After the “Damascus road”, is it the Tehran road that will peacefully resolve the Lebanese question?
