Should we really rejoice at the interruption of the electoral process that was to lead to the presidency of Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the AKP, the Justice and Development Islamic Party? Indeed, the secular and nationalist opposition forces inspired by Kemalism applauded the decision of the Constitutional Court requiring the presence of two-thirds of the Members of Parliament during the electoral college that appoints the head of state. Additionally, the hundreds of thousands of protesters who have been mobilizing against the AKP from Ankara to Istanbul for several weeks have – apparently – won their case. Finally, the Court’s decision temporarily wards off the specter of a military coup whose political consequences are as uncertain as they are economically disastrous for the country.
The announcement of early parliamentary elections for July 22 has even been welcomed as a resolution to the crisis. This is not the case. The crisis is simply postponed to the summer, where the situation is likely to become even more tense: constitutional amendments that may be voted on by then by the AKP parliamentary majority (lowering the eligibility age of MPs to 25 years or even the direct universal suffrage election of the President) will allow it to rely more heavily on its already well-established electoral base in the country. Thus, it will be even more difficult for Atatürk’s supporters to oppose, after this new election, the maneuvers of the “Islamists” whose legitimacy will probably be strengthened. Similarly, the Turkish Army, the last bastion of original Kemalism, will have no choice but to act after the awkward publication of its “midnight memorandum,” a barely disguised ultimatum, if it wants to maintain its credibility.
This scenario is reminiscent of Algeria in the early 90s when the imminent arrival in Parliament of the Islamists of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) after their first local successes was blocked by the military high command. With well-known consequences, both domestically and abroad.
As reported by “Le Monde” and “Arte Infos,” the official support given to the Turkish Foreign Minister by the EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, takes on essential political significance under these circumstances. More concerned about the actions of the Turkish military than about the supposed or real Islamism of the AKP, Brussels apparently considers these blockages likely to fuel extremist plays and thus shows its preference for allowing the governing party to reach supreme power: this at least has the merit of clarity and offers Europeans the opportunity to judge on the merits. The exercise of presidential responsibilities, which allow the head of state to veto laws and appoint senior civil servants, would, in this scenario, reinforce the moderation of the “Islamists.” Should he persist in his intentions, would the current candidate confirm in his future decisions his publicly stated view about “Islam as a way of life” to be imposed in Turkey or his depiction of “the atheism of the military and the secular elites as an enemy of religion”? Would he still support, to the dismay of the Kemalists, his “veiled” wife in the lawsuit she had filed before the European Court of Human Rights, against the practices of the Turkish Republic that bans its wear in universities? As one might guess, this European orientation, if confirmed by the EU, remains as bold as it is speculative. And not without risk for the future of its twenty-seven member states.
