In the Near and Middle East, things are not what they are. They are what they seem. Willingly or unwillingly, American diplomacy could be drawn more quickly than it wishes into the dangerous maelstrom of this region. As a consequence, there is the embarrassing obligation to shed, in the eyes of the world, the friendly face of offered dialogue and the extended handshake, elements on which candidate Obama naturally based his presidential campaign. From the visit to Washington of the Israeli Prime Minister to the visibility of the American commitment in Lebanon, everything is indeed about clarity and realism.
Contrary to the generally pessimistic echoes of the press, Israeli diplomatic sources downplay the extent of differences between Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama: this “first meeting” rather marks the “beginning of a dialogue process,” a “desire to agree” which takes into account both “history” and the “environment.” An environment so “unpredictable in this part of the world,” the Israeli side insists, that it necessitates “not making too far-reaching forecasts.” Is this the reason why the crucial element of these talks ultimately lies in the announcement—an American concession?—of a deadline on negotiations with Iran? This deadline—the end of the year 2009—coincides, it is worth noting, with estimates from Israeli intelligence services on the limit beyond which they believe the Islamic Republic of Iran will be more easily able to acquire a nuclear weapon. A deadline which an Israeli specialist in new technologies also describes as “virtual”: nothing “will prevent a preemptive strike once the survival of the country is at stake.” And the articles published in the press with Israeli Defense Forces’ general staff maps to support, according to him, only serve to show the “feasibility” of such an operation while “increasing psychological pressures on the regime” of the mullahs. Perhaps even consider other actions within Iran. Could this be the “unexpected” that could, according to the Israeli diplomat, “make things go in the right direction” and which it would be impossible for Washington to ignore?
With Syria, the second example, American diplomacy officially continues a dialogue: the repeated trips of the American envoy Jeffrey Feltman to Damascus thus show the international community in general and the Arab world in particular, the goodwill of Washington. But the acting Deputy Secretary of State for the Near East privately explains that the United States has “no illusions” about potential cooperation with Syria: the recent renewal of Congressional sanctions against the Alawite regime, obtained with the full approval of the White House, confirms these statements. Denounced last month by General Petraeus, head of the United States Central Command for operations in the Middle East, the new influx of foreign fighters passing through Syria to go to Iraq and the overt support of Bashar al-Assad to the Iranian president Ahmadinejad during his recent visit to Syria, do not augur a shift by Damascus on two topics deemed highly sensitive in Washington.
Finally, perhaps in Lebanon, American diplomacy, if one dares say, hides the least: passage in the country of cedars of Hillary Clinton reserving her meetings for President Sleimane and displaying her support for the March 14 coalition. A stop followed by an even more political visit, a few days later, by the American Vice President Joe Biden. In the middle of the legislative campaign, his message was very clear: future American aid will depend on the results of the elections on June 7.
An electoral situation that could become seriously complicated after the surprising revelations of the “Spiegel”: the latter mentions confidential documents of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to which the magazine had access and which attribute the responsibility for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri to Hezbollah. Welcome information for Damascus. And the timing of their publication—a “scheduled unexpected”?—raises questions about a possible electoral exploitation of the information held by the Tribunal. It remains to be seen if the latter will dare to issue a warrant against the individuals named in these reports—a casus belli for the Shiite militia—and qualify the facts, as defended by a source inside the Tribunal, as a “terrorist crime” or even a “crime against humanity” because it was “committed as part of a systematic, concerted attack linked to other crimes.” In terms of “unexpecteds,” as we see, American diplomacy in the Near and Middle East is likely to be served.
